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ARTICLES
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
James N. Christman*
I. INTRODUCTION
This article covers changes made to the Virginia Administrative
Process Act (VAPA)1 during the 1992 session of the General As-
sembly. It also covers selected recent cases from Virginia courts
dealing with state administrative procedure decided between Au-
gust 30, 1990 and September 17, 1992.
II. STATUTES
The General Assembly made no major changes to the Adminis-
trative Process Act in 1992.2 Probably the most important, or at
least most useful, enactment in this area was the one authorizing a
codification of Virginia administrative regulations.3 An upcoming
report on administrative law reform by the Joint Legislative Audit
and Review Commission (JLARC) also has the potential to be
significant.
* Partner, Hunton & Williams, Richmond, Virginia; B.S., 1970, University of Illinois;
J.D., 1973, University of Michigan. Mr. Christman is Chairman of the Administrative Law
Section of the Virginia Bar Association. The author is indebted to Brian L. Buniva of Mez-
zullo & McCandlish of Richmond, Virginia, whose talk on "Recent Developments in Virginia
Administrative Law" to the winter meeting of the Virginia Bar Association on January 18,
1992, was enormously helpful.
1. Administrative Process Act, VA. ConE ANN. §§ 9-6.14:1 to :25 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum.
Supp. 1992).
2. A list of bills affecting administrative law distributed by the Virginia Bar Association
in March 1992 was invaluable in preparing this summary.
3. See infra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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A. Administrative Law Code
Although the Michie Company publishes an index4 to the regula-
tions of Virginia administrative agencies, there is no single compi-
lation of the full text of state regulations. Practitioners must cull
what they need from the Virginia Register of Regulations5 or ask
each agency for a copy of its regulations. In 1992 Virginia joined
the majority of states6 that codify agency rules. The legislature
gave the Virginia Code Commission authority to publish an official
code of administrative regulations, either by using state resources
or by contracting with a private publisher.' The project is to be
undertaken without spending general fund revenues.8
B. Interim Report by JLARC
The 1991 General Assembly requested JLARC to study whether
amendments to VAPA are necessary.9 JLARC published an in-
terim report early in 1992 describing the structure, features, and
stages of VAPA and the historical development of the Act.10 It
summarizes the remarks received and issues raised at a JLARC
hearing in September 1991 and identifies nine preliminary study
issues, such as whether the administrative process be made more
efficient without sacrificing quality of input."
A final report is expected in the autumn of 1992.12
4. See, e.g., CODE OF VIRGINIA 1950 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPENDIX 1990-1991 (published
under the supervision of the Virginia Code Commission pursuant to VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-
6.19, -77.12 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1992)).
5. Even this will not work for regulations that were promulgated before the Virginia Reg-
ister of Regulations began publication or that are too lengthy to be published in the Regis-
ter. See, e.g., 7:20 Va. Regs. Reg. 3028 (1991) (summarizing regulations governing special
education programs for handicapped children because of the length of the full text).
6. According to information provided to a JLARC subcommittee on September 9, 1991,
Virginia was then one of only ten states that did not publish a code of regulations.
7. Act of Mar. 6, 1992, ch. 216, 1992 Va. Acts 278 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-6.14:22,
.17, 9-77.7, .8, .10, .11, .11:01, .12 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1992)).
8. Id.
9. H.J. Res. 397, Va. Gen. Assembly, (Reg. Sess. 1991).
10. INTERIM REPORT OF THE JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT AND REVIEW COMMISSION ON REVIEW
OF VIRGINIA'S ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AcT, H. Doc. No. 32 (1992).
11. Id. at 30.
12. Personal communication with JLARC staff, October 12, 1992. The preface to Interim
Report, supra note 10, predicted a final report in the summer of 1992.
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C. Freedom of Information Act
During the 1992 session four bills were passed amending the Vir-
ginia Freedom of Information Act.13 Discussions of the expansion
of an existing business or industry were added to the purposes for
which a public body may conduct a closed meeting. 14 As befits the
"Information Age," the legislation affecting the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act had a distinctly high-tech flavor. The Assembly ex-
empted from disclosure information that "describes the design,
function, operation or access control features of any security sys-
tem ...used to control access to or use of any automated data
processing or telecommunications system.' 1 5 The legislature per-
manently codified the authority of public bodies to conduct official
meetings by electronic means.'6 Political subdivisions and local
governing bodies, however, still may not conduct official meetings
electronically.17
Other amendments exempt from disclosure include certain spe-
cialized types of documents, namely: (1) records of neighborhood
crime watch programs;" (2) papers prepared after June 30, 1992,
and held by mayors and other chief executive officers of political
subdivisions that deal with evaluation of performance of locally
elected officials;' 9 and (3) certain security materials of the Virginia
Board of Youth and Family Services and the Virginia Department
of Youth and Family Services and. its juvenile facilities.20
D. State Corporation Commission
The General Assembly amended provisions in section 13.1-518 of
the Code of Virginia (Code) governing disclosure of information
13. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-340 to -346.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
14. Act of Mar. 23, 1992, ch. 444, 1992 Va. Acts 571 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-344
(Cum. Supp. 1992)).
15. Act of Feb. 26, 1992, ch. 40, 1992 Va. Acts 38 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-342(47)
(Cum. Supp. 1992)).
16. Act of Mar. 4, 1992, ch. 153, 1992 Va. Acts 185 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-
343.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
17. Id.
18. Act of Mar. 5, 1992, ch. 207, 1992 Va. Acts 263 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-
342(B)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1992)). However, these records may be disclosed by their custodian
unless specifically prohibited by law. Id.
19. Act of Apr. 1, 1992 ch. 593, 1992 Va. Acts 846 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-
342(B)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
20. Act of Mar. 4, 1992, ch. 150, 1992 Va. Acts 178 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-
342(B)(32) (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
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obtained by the State Corporation Commission (SCC) through its
investigations. 21 The SCC is authorized to disclose information or
documents to quasi-governmental entities associated with law en-
forcement.22 Also, the Virginia Securities Act was amended to clar-
ify that the SCC is authorized to determine whether its rules have
been violated.23 Formerly, the language referred only to violations
of SCC orders and injunctions.24 Also, the limitation of twenty
dollars per day on SCC's cost recovery for investigators has been
eliminated.2"
E. Public Procurement
The Code now requires public employees having official respon-
sibility for procurement transactions in which they participated to
submit a yearly written certification that they complied with the
Virginia Public Procurement Act.26 Public employees having offi-
cial responsibility for procurement transactions are prohibited
from knowingly making or using misrepresentations.
F. Subpoenas
The Code has been amended to provide that no fee will be
charged for the service of a subpoena under VAPA. s
III. THE COURTS
Decisions by Virginia courts on administrative law in this period
were, for the most part, routine. The only real interest lies in the
decisions on standing.
21. See Act of Mar. 4, 1992, ch. 157, 1992 Va. Acts 189 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
518 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-518 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
25. See id.
26. Act of Apr. 5, 1992, ch. 761, 1992 Va. Acts 1183 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-79.1,
.2 (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
27. Id.
28. Act of Apr. 3, 1992, ch. 648, 1992 Va. Acts 955 (codified at VA. CODE ANN. § 14.1-105
(Cure. Supp. 1992)).
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A. Standing
The law of "standing" determines who may petition a court to
review agency action. Under federal law, standing is part of the
"case" or "controversy" language of the United States Constitu-
tion.29 The Virginia Constitution, on the other hand, contains no
case or controversy requirement. Instead, court jurisdiction is pre-
scribed entirely by statute. Historically, Virginia courts have
awarded standing to challenge agency action less freely than the
federal courts.
The law of standing in Virginia varies depending on whether one
is challenging "case decisions" or "regulations." VAPA provides for
judicial review of a case decision by any "party aggrieved by and
claiming unlawfulness of a case decision" and of an agency rule by
"[a]ny person affected by and claiming the unlawfulness of any
regulation." 30 The "basic law"'" can, however, further limit the op-
portunity to challenge an agency action.
1. Standing to Challenge a "Case Decision"
The principal issue regarding standing to challenge case deci-
sions is whether a public interest group or members of the public
can challenge the granting of an environmental permit, either on
their own behalf or perhaps as "private attorneys general" on be-
half of the public. At the federal level, this issue has been fought
out many times before such agencies as the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
Two 1991 cases by the Virginia Court of Appeals present an ob-
stacle to environmental groups and members of the public who
seek to challenge a case decision.
In Environmental Defense Fund v. Virginia State Water Con-
trol Board32 the court of appeals found that an environmental
group, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF), lacked standing to
29. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see 2 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 10.3 (1985).
30. VA. CoDE ANN. § 9-6.14:16 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:4(C) (Repl. Vol. 1989) defines "basic law" as "provisions of the
Constitution and statutes of the Commonwealth of Virginia authorizing an agency to make
regulations or decide cases or containing procedural requirements therefor."
32. 12 Va. App. 456, 404 S.E.2d 728 (1991).
1992] 565
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challenge the State Water Control Board's issuance of a Virginia
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (VPDES) permit.33
The owners of a poultry processing plant in Shenandoah County
applied for an amendment to their VPDES permit in order to al-
low amounts of effluent discharged to vary depending on the flow
of the receiving river. 4 EDF commented on the proposed amend-
ment, both at the public hearing and in writing.35 The Water
Board authorized reissuance of the amended permit, and EDF ap-
pealed to the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond."
The water control law gives standing to an "owner aggrieved; '3 7
VAPA gives standing, as noted above, to a "party aggrieved by and
claiming unlawfulness of a case decision. '38 EDF argued that even
if it wasn't an "owner aggrieved" under the water control law, it
was a "party aggrieved" under VAPA.39 The circuit court agreed
that EDF might qualify under either provision, since the water law
does not "specifically exclude appeal under the APA."40 However,
the circuit court found that in this case, EDF did not have stand-
ing under either statute.41
The court of appeals did not agree with the trial court that EDF
had two distinct statutory chances for standing.42 It noted that
VAPA states that its "purpose is to supplement. . . basic laws,"43
and that the "owner aggrieved" language would be meaningless if
EDF's argument were accepted.44 It held that "where the basic law
contains a specific standing requirement. . . [it] is controlling over
the standardized court review" provided by VAPA.45
Thus, EDF had standing as an owner aggrieved under the basic
law or not at all. The court of appeals agreed with the trial court
that EDF was not an owner aggrieved as defined by the basic law 8
33. Id. at 465, 404 S.E.2d at 733-35.
34. Id. at 458, 404 S.E.2d at 729.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 459, 404 S.E.2d at 730.
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.29 (Repl Vol. 1992).
38. Id. § 9-6.14:16 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
39. Environmental Defense Fund, 12 Va. App. at 459, 404 S.E.2d at 730.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 460, 404 S.E.2d at 730.
42. Id. at 461, 404 S.E.2d at 731.
43. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:3 (Repl. Vol. 1989)).
44. Environmental Defense Fund, 12 Va. App. at 462, 404 S.E.2d at 731-32.
45. Id. at 462, 404 S.E.2d at 732.
46. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.3 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
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and was therefore denied standing to challenge the final Board
decision.47
Finally, the court of appeals held that EDF's lack of standing to
challenge the final Board decision necessarily barred it from ap-
pealing the Water Board's denial of its request for a formal hear-
ing.48 Appeal was unavailable under VAPA because section 9-
6.14:16 provides only for appeal of a "case decision ' '49 which, in
turn, means a determination of the rights of a "named party." 50
EDF was not a "named party" before the Water Board.51 Simi-
larly, EDF had no appeal under the Water Control Law because
the Water Board's Procedural Rule 1 does not provide for appeal
from a denial of a formal hearing and the water control legislation
limits review to an "owner. '52
The outcome was the same when a permittee's neighbors at-
tempted to claim standing in Town of Fries v. State Water Con-
trol Board.53 This time a downstream town (Fries), a civic associa-
tion, a sand and gravel operator, and fifteen downstream riparian
land owners sought review of a Water Board case decision granting
a VPDES permit to the City of Galax for an enlarged sewage treat-
ment plant upstream from the plaintiffs.54 The court of appeals
again denied standing on the basis that the plaintiffs were neither
"parties aggrieved"5 5 nor "owners aggrieved."56
Relying on the Environmental Defense Fund decision, the Town
of Fries court ruled that the VAPA judicial review section does not
create a basis for jurisdiction in addition to the basic water control
law.57 Moreover, the water control law provides court review only
to an "owner aggrieved" and therefore implicitly denies that right
to others."
47. Environmental Defense Fund, 12 Va. App. at 463, 404 S.E.2d at 732.
48. Id.
49. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:16(A) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
50. Id. § 9-6.14:4(D).
51. Environmental Defense Fund, 12 Va. App. at 464, 404 S.E.2d at 733-35.
52. Id. at 464-65, 404 S.E.2d at 733-35 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.29(1) (Repl. Vol.
1992)).
53. 13 Va. App. 213, 409 S.E.2d 634 (1991).
54. Id. at 215, 409 S.E.2d at 635.
55. Id. at 216, 409 S.E.2d at 636.
56. Id. at 217, 409 S.E.2d at 637.
57. Id. at 216, 409 S.E.2d at 636.
58. Id.
1992]
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Interpreting the review provision in the water control law, the
Town of Fries court emphasized that the term "aggrieved" has
specific meaning in Virginia law.5 9 A petitioner "must show that he
has an immediate, pecuniary and substantial interest in the litiga-
tion, and not a remote or indirect interest."60 A petitioner must
also establish a denial of a "personal or property right, legal or
equitable, or imposition of a burden or obligation upon the peti-
tioner different from that suffered by the public generally."'"
Consequently, there was no standing for the town, which repre-
sented citizens who intended to use the New River for drinking
water; for the Fries Civic League, which the court said had "no
identified specific interest" in the Galax permit; or for the down-
stream riparian owners.2
Interestingly, the court found that the sand and gravel company,
which had its own VPDES permit to discharge into the same river,
also had not shown an immediate, pecuniary, and substantial in-
terest in the Galax permit.63 Yet one discharger's effluent can cer-
tainly affect another's permit, particularly when permit limits are
based on water quality standards and "wasteload allocations. '6 4
The effect of these two cases is that under state law no one can
challenge a Water Board permit except the permittee6 There is
still an open issue, however, whether an environmental group
might challenge a permit in federal court. Under the federal Clean
Water Act, all state-issued VPDES permits are subject to review
by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).6 If the EPA de-
termines that a permit is not in accordance with law, it can disap-
59. Id. at 217, 409 S.E.2d at 637.
60. Id. (quoting Virginia Beach Beautification Comm'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 231
Va. 415, 419, 344 S.E.2d 899, 902 (1986)) (quoting Nicholas v. Lawrence, 161 Va. 589, 593,
171 S.E. 673, 674 (1933)).
61. Town of Fries, 13 Va. App. at 217, 409 S.E.2d at 637 (quoting Virginia Beach Beauti-
fication Comm'n v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 231 Va. 415, 419-20, 344 S.E.2d 899, 903
(1986)).
62. Town of Fries, 13 Va. App. at 217, 409 S.E.2d at 637.
63. Id. at 217-18, 409 S.E.2d at 637.
64. See Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(d) (West 1986 & Supp. 1992),
which provides for the establishment of "total maximum daily loads" of pollutants.
65. H.B. 450, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1992) carried over from the 1992 session of
the General Assembly, would amend both the water control and the air control laws to allow
an appeal by "any person aggrieved" by a final permitting decision of the Air Pollution
Control Board or the State Water Control Board.
66. See Clean Water Act § 402(d)(1), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(d)(1) (West 1986).
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prove the permit and issue a federal permit instead.6 7 In theory, at
least, a citizens' group might attempt to challenge EPA's failure to
disapprove a state permit and obtain judicial review in that
manner.
Environmentalists seeking standing under the State Air Pollu-
tion Control Law 8 encountered similar difficulties. In Citizens for
Clean Air v. State Air Pollution Control Board,69 an environmen-
tal group (CCA) sought standing to appeal the Air Board's grant-
ing of a permit to a poultry processing plant in Rockingham
County. The plant wanted to enlarge its plant and asked the Air
Pollution Control Board for a modification to its air permit for this
purpose.70 Members of CCA appeared at the hearing and offered
evidence against the proposed modification; nevertheless, the
Board granted the permit.71 CCA requested and was denied a for-
mal hearing.72 CCA appealed the Board's decision to the Circuit
Court of Rockingham County and then to the court of appeals.73
The State Air Pollution Control Law allows an appeal by "[a]ny
owner aggrieved by a final decision of the Board. ... ' The court
of appeals held that CCA did not have standing, since "owner" re-
fers to an owner of an actual or potential source of air pollution. 75
Likewise, CCA had no standing to appeal under the "other person
aggrieved" provision of the Air Board's regulations 76 because the
state cannot be sued without its consent and section 10.1-1318 of
67. Id. This federal check on state permits was cited by the Town of Fries court. Town of
Fries, 13 Va. App. at 216 n.1, 409 S.E.2d at 636 n.1.
68. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10.1-1300 to -1326 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
69. 13 Va. App. 430, 412 S.E.2d 715 (1991).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 432, 412 S.E.2d at 717.
72. Id. at 433, 412 S.E.2d at 717,
73. See id. at 432-34, 412 S.E.2d at 716-17.
74. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1318 (Repl. Vol. 1989). Virginia standing requirements may
have to be changed to some limited extent because of § 502(b)(6) of the federal Clean Air
Act. By the terms of that section, one of the minimum elements of the state's permitting
program for sources of air pollutants is "an opportunity for judicial review in State court of
the final permit action by the applicant, any person who participated in the public comment
process, and any other person who could obtain judicial review of that action under applica-
ble law." Clean air Act § 502(b)(6), 42 U.S.C.A. § 7661a(b)(6) (West Supp. 1992).
75. Citizens for Clean Air, 13 Va. App. at 440, 412 S.E.2d at 721.
76. VR 120-01, § 120-02-09. The Air Pollution Control Board has recently proposed an
amendment to this regulation which would provide "any party significantly affected" by an
action of the Board to request a formal hearing. 8:21 Va. Regs. Reg. 3629, 3643 (July 13,
1992).
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the Air Pollution Control Law77 limits standing to an "owner
aggrieved. '7 8
2. Standing to Challenge Regulations
As noted above, VAPA authorizes "[a]ny person affected by and
claiming the unlawfulness of any regulation" to seek judicial re-
view of the regulation. 9 In 1991 the Circuit Court for the City of
Richmond interpreted this "person affected" standard and gave
some insight into how it differs from the "party aggrieved" stan-
dard for reviewing case decisions.
In Environmental Defense Fund v. State Water Control
Board,0 Judge Markow held that both riparian owners', and the
Environmental Defense Fund82 (EDF) had standing to challenge a
water quality standard for dioxin.
The State Water Control Law provides that the validity of any
regulation may be determined by judicial review in accordance
with VAPA.83 Judge Markow held that a water quality standard 4is
a "regulation" for this purpose.85 VAPA provides judicial review
for any "person affected by and claiming the unlawfulness of any
regulation."' 6
Judge Markow relied on Continental Baking Co. v. City of
Charlottesville17 in holding that riparian owners were "persons af-
fected" and had standing because of their special interest in water
quality.8 8 Moreover, EDF was granted standing in its representa-
tive capacity for its individual members.89 The court found that
77. VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-1318 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
78. Citizens for Clean Air, 13 Va. App. at 440, 412 S.E.2d at 721.
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:16 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
80. 22 Va. Cir. 412 (Richmond City 1991).
81. Id. at 418.
82. Id. at 420.
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.24(1) (Repl. Vol. 1992).
84. A water quality standard is an ambient standard that specifies an acceptable level of
a pollutant in the receiving stream. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 303, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313
(West 1986 & Supp. 1992). For example, a water quality standard might prescribe that the
average daily concentration of total residual chlorine in freshwater should not exceed eleven
parts per billion. See 7:15 Va. Regs. Reg. 2220, § 680-21-01.11(1)(A) (1991).
85. Environmental Defense Fund, 22 Va. Cir. at 412.
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:16(A) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
87. 202 Va. 798, 120 S.E.2d 476 (1961).
88. Environmental Defense Fund, 22 Va. Cir. at 414.
89. Id. at 419.
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EDF met the representative standing test established by the
United States Supreme Court in Sierra Club v. Morton.90
B. VAPA as Backstop to the Basic Law
In School Board of York v. Nicely,91 the Court of Appeals of
Virginia considered whether the basic law or VAPA would deter-
mine the statute of limitations. In Nicely, a state review officer, in
an administrative due process hearing, directed the school board to
pay the cost of placing a handicapped man in an expensive private
treatment facility.2 Eighty-one days later, the school board filed a
motion for judgment in circuit court for review of the finding of
the review officer.9 3 The Nicelys argued that the thirty-day limita-
tion prescribed by VAPA barred the school board's action. 4 The
school board countered that the one-year statute of limitations in
Virginia Code section 8.01-248 applied 95 since there is no statute of
limitations in the Virginia special education statutes.96
The court held that the one-year catch-all statute applied in-
stead of the VAPA thirty-day limitation, stating that VAPA is in-
tended to supplement the basic law and provide a default where
the basic law fails to provide process.97 Here the basic law did not
provide a statute of limitations; nevertheless, the court found that
under Forbes v. Kenley,9s the VAPA limitation did not apply.99
Applying Forbes v. Kenley, the court of appeals held that Virginia
90. Id. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), in which the Court held that
under § 10 of the federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702, the environmental
group lacked standing to challenge the construction of a ski resort in Mineral King Valley in
the Sequoia National Forest. Id. at 727. The Sierra Club Court used the following two-part
test for standing: (1) the party must allege "injury-in-fact" and (2) the injury must be to an
interest "arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated" by the statutes
that the agency is claimed to have violated. Id. at 733.
The Sierra Club demonstrated an "injury-in-fact" by alleging injury to aesthetic or envi-
ronmental well-being. Id. at 734. The court found, however, that the Club had failed to
allege that it was among the injured, because it did not allege that it or its members would
be affected by the resort development. Id. at 735.
91. 12 Va. App. 1051, 408 S.E.2d 545 (1991).
92. Id. at 1054, 408 S.E.2d at 546.
93. Id. at 1054, 408 S.E.2d at 547.
94. Id.
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-248 (Repl. Vol. 1992).
96. Id.; see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22.1-213 to -221 (Repl. Vol. 1985 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
97. 12 Va. App. at 1058, 1065, 408 S.E.2d at 549, 553.
98. 227 Va. 55, 314 S.E.2d 49 (1984).
99. See Nicely, 12 Va. App. at 1059, 408 S.E.2d at 549.
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Code section 22.1-214(D) provided sufficient due process to fore-
stall application of the VAPA thirty-day statute of limitations. 100
C. Emergency Regulations
When a regulation is found by a court to be invalid, the agency
will sometimes try to remedy the situation by repromulgating the
regulation as an "emergency" provision. The State Water Control
Board (SWCB) made such an effort in 198810 after the Circuit
Court of the City of Roanoke invalidated the board's water quality
standard for chlorine.1
0 2
In that case, State Water Control Board v. Appalachian Power
Co.,10 3 the Court of Appeals of Virginia, upon rehearing en banc
held that the SWCB could not use an emergency regulation to cure
the deficient adoption process. 104 The court found that if an agency
could simply enact an emergency regulation to moot the questions
about the permanent regulation's validity, then "every challenged
regulation which the agency has deemed it necessary to keep in
force by emergency measures would be placed beyond [judicial]
review." 0 5
D. Mootness
In the same case, State Water Control Board v. Appalachian
Power Co., 06 Appalachian Power argued that whether the SWCB
standards were valid was a moot question because (1) the disputed
standard had been long since replaced and (2) the General Assem-
bly had since amended the basic law such that a formal hearing
was no longer required prior to the enactment of a standard.10 7
100. Id. at 1061, 408 S.E.2d at 552.
101. See State Water Control Bd. v. Appalachian Power Co., 9 Va. App. 254, 261 n.4, 386
S.E.2d 633, 637 n.4 (1989), aff'd on reh'g en banc, 12 Va. App. 73, 402 S.E.2d 703 (1991).
102. See id. at 259, 386 S.E.2d at 635. The circuit court found the SWCB's water quality
standard to be invalid because the board had not held a formal evidentiary hearing before
amending the standard as required by the basic law. Id. In 1989, while this case was pend-
ing, the General Assembly amended the basic law to provide a formal evidentiary hearing is
not required unless requested. State Water Control Bd. v. Appalachian Power Co., 12 Va.
App. 73, 76 n.2, 402 S.E.2d 703, 705 n.2. (1991).
103. 12 Va. App. 73, 402 S.E.2d 703 (1991).
104. Id. at 76, 402 S.E.2d at 705.
105. Id.
106. 12 Va. App. 73, 402 S.E.2d 703 (1991).
107. Id. at 74, 402 S.E.2d at 704. The failure to conduct a formal evidential hearing prior
to the enactment of the standard was the basis of the original dispute. Id.
[Vol. 26:561
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The court of appeals disagreed and held that the Water Control
Board's action in adopting the original regulation was not moot,
notwithstanding the fact that the basic law governing the SWCB
had been amended and that the disputed standard had been re-
placed.108 The majority determined, under the doctrine of "capable
of repetition, but evading review," that a real controversy contin-
ued to exist to the extent that the validity of the regulation might
affect pending controversies or enforcement proceedings imple-
mented by the State Water Control Board against Appalachian
Power Company or others who might have been subject to the reg-
ulation from the time of its initial adoption until the adoption of
the emergency regulation. 10 9
E. Hearing Officers
In Virginia Board of Medicine v. Fetta,110 the Court of Appeals
of Virginia affirmed the trial court's finding that the Board of
Medicine (Board) had violated its statutory authority with proce-
dures used at an evidentiary hearing. The Board allowed three of
its members to preside at the evidentiary hearing along with the
hearing officer."' The court held that the basic law authorizes an
evidentiary hearing before a hearing officer alone or before a quo-
rum of the Board, but not before a panel comprised of just three
members of the Board." 2 The purpose of the statute is to allow the
board members to receive information on an equal basis, and this
purpose was violated by the Board's procedure." 3
F. Remedies
In the same case, Virginia Board of Medicine v. Fetta,"14 the
trial court and the court of appeals simply ordered the Board to
dismiss the complaints against Dr. Fetta instead of remanding the
case to the Board. 1 5 The trial court found that the Board had
been tainted by the practice of having three of its members sit
108. Id.
109. Id. at 75-76, 402 S.E.2d at 705.
110. 12 Va. App. 1173, 408 S.E.2d 573 (1991), afld. No. 911526 (Va. Sept. 18, 1992). The
supreme court opinion says that four -Board members sat with the hearing officer.
111. Id. at 1175, 408 S.E.2d at 574.
112. Id. at 1175, 408 S.E.2d at 575; See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-110(A) (Repl. Vol. 1991).
113. 12 Va. App. at 1175-76, 408 S.E.2d at 575.
114. 12 Va. App. 1173, 408 S.E.2d 573 (1991), aff'd, No. 911526 (Va. Sept. 18, 1992).
115. Id. at 1177, 408 S.E.2d at 575.
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with the hearing officer during the hearing. 116 The appellate court
affirmed on the ground that the trial court's decision was discre-
tionary and that it had not abused that discretion. 117 The Com-
monwealth subsequently noted its appeal to the Supreme Court of
Virginia, which affirmed the court of appeals on September 18,
1992.118
One way of compelling an agency to do its duty is a writ of man-
damus, but such a writ is not readily granted, as illustrated by a
1988 circuit court case, Homestretch Corp. v. Board of Supervisors
of Culpeper County.119 There the plaintiffs sought alternatively a
declaratory judgment or a writ of mandamus directing the State
Water Control Board to cease consideration of an application for a
centralized sewer system; the plaintiffs claimed that there were de-
ficiencies in the certificate required under Code section 62.1-
44.15:3 pertaining to the application for a certificate for a sewage
discharge permit. 120 The court refused, saying that mandamus
clearly would not lie to order the SWCB to cease considering an
application that was within its discretion. 2' Moreover, the court
said that a declaratory judgment cannot be substituted for an ap-
peal under VAPA.122
The plaintiff in Evans v. Chief of Police"2 3 had more success. In
this case of alleged violations of the Privacy Protection Act of
1976,124 for which mandamus is specifically authorized," 5 the court
held that a writ of mandamus is the appropriate legal remedy for
requiring the police to show an employee her personal file.2 6 The
court discussed the three elements of a mandamus action and
found that the plaintiff had satisfied all three at least for the pur-
pose of defeating a demurrer:
(1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the relief sought,
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See Virginia Bd. of Medicine v. Fetta, No. 911526 (Va. Sept. 18, 1992).
119. 22 Va. Cir. 549 (Culpeper County 1988).
120. Id. at 550.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 20 Va. Cir. 487 (Fairfax County 1990).
124. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-377 to -386 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
125. Id. § 2.1-386 (Repl. Vol. 1987)
126. Evans, 20 Va. Cir. at 487; see VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-382.3(a) (Repl. Vol. 1987).
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(2) a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent to do the
thing the petitioner seeks to compel (there being no mandamus for
a discretionary act), and
(3) the absence of another adequate remedy at law.12
G. Written Standards for Agency Decisionmaking
In Dotti v. Virginia Board of Medicine,"28 the Court of Appeals
of Virginia overturned a reprimand issued by the Board of
Medicine to a chiropractor who had held himself out as a specialist
in sports medicine. 29 The reprimand was held to be a violation of
the chiropractor's First Amendment right to free speech because
the board had set no standards by which to judge whether the ad-
vertisement was untruthful or misleading. 30
H. Policy Statements, "Guidance" Documents, and Interpretive
Rules
An agency's use of written guidelines, which it claims are not
''rules," to guide agency decisions continues to be controversial.
Usually the issue arises when an agency applies a "policy state-
ment," "guidance document," or "interpretive rule." If such infor-
mal guidelines are applied too rigidly, they run afoul of a principle
addressed in McLouth Steel Products Corp. v. Thomas'3' and
must be promulgated with proper notice and comment
procedures. 132
In Virginia Board of Medicine v. Virginia Physical Therapy
Ass'n,"'33 the Board of Medicine followed three opinions of the At-
torney General 4 in finding that non-physician-supervised electro-
myographic (EMG) examinations were beyond the scope of the li-
censes of physical therapists. 3 5 Since this determination was
127. Evans, 20 Va. Cir. at 487-88.
128. 12 Va. App. 735, 407 S.E.2d 8 (1991).
129. Id. at 737, 407 S.E.2d at 10.
130. Id. at 742, 407 S.E.2d at 13.
131. 838 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In Thomas, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals expanded upon the two-prong test for distinguishing between rules and policies
promulgated in Community Nutrition Inst. v. Young, 818 F.2d 943 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
132. See generally McLouth Steel Products Corp., 838 F.2d at 1320-23.
133. 13 Va. App. 458, 413 S.E.2d 59 (1991).
134. Id. at 461, 413 S.E.2d at 61-62; see also 1989 VA. ATr'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 281 (1989);
1984-85 VA. ATT'y GEN. ANN. REP. 231 (1985); 1984-85 VA. ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 172 (1984).
135. Virginia Bd. of Medicine, 13 Va. App. at 461, 413 S.E.2d at 61-62.
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neither a "rule" nor a "case decision" the court of appeals held
that it was not reviewable. i3 6 The court recognized that parties
who are adversely affected by "de facto rules" before such rules are
applied in a case decision are denied relief and that Virginia law
contains a "gap" in this respect.13 7
A private party in the case of W. v. Jackson13 denied a com-
plaint of child abuse levied against him.13 A social worker advised
him by letter that the charges against him were "founded" and
that his name and his child's name would be placed in the central
registry in Richmond. 140 After a hearing officer affirmed the initial
"founded" finding, the man appealed to the circuit court.""
The principal issue was the lawfulness of regulations adopted by
the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services. 42 Central
to the court's analysis was the Virginia Code's definition of child
"abuse," which includes "mental injury."'143 The Commissioner
adopted regulations defining "mental abuse" to include threaten-
ing "to inflict injury to the mental functioning of the child;" such
might be demonstrated by "significant mental difficulty which is
caused or perpetuated by a pattern of identifiable behavior by the
caretaker. "'44
The court held that the Commissioner had "overstepped the
bounds of administration and entered the arena of legislation" by
enacting his own definition of child abuse and neglect. 145 The court
also agreed that the Department's guidelines were impermissibly
vague. 14 The court was of the view that "[u]nder these exceedingly
broad and vague guidelines, it is very easy for any lay person, not
to mention the skilled, experienced professional social worker, to
conceive of innumerable situations in which most any parent could
be deemed guilty of child abuse.' 147 The court pointed out that
136. Id. at 466-69, 413 S.E.2d at 65.
137. Id. at 469, 413 S.E.2d at 65-66.
138. 22 Va. Cir. 114 (Washington County 1990), rev'd, 14 Va. App. -, 419 S.E.2d 385
(1992).
139. Id. at 115.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 115-16.
142. Id. at 120-22.
143. VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-248.2 (Repl. Vol. 1991).
144. Virginia Dept. of Social Services, Protective Services Handbook, § 3, ch. A.
145. W. v. Jackson, 22 Va. Cir. at 122.
146. Id. at 123.
147. Id.
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"for an administrative regulation to pass muster under the due
process clause, it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair
notice of what is required. '148
The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that there was
no due process deprivation because no liberty or property interest
was at stake.149 It agreed that more than mere injury to reputation
is necessary to implicate due process, because there must' be
"stigma-plus."' 150 The court did, however, recognize numerous ways
in which the parent's liberty or property interest might be ad-
versely affected by the agency action to label him as a child abuser,
such as being denied employment in a day care center or being
denied a position as a youth leader in church or little league
baseball.' 5 '
The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed, 52 holding that the
guidelines are not regulations, but interpretive rules, the adoption
of which is within the Commissioner's authority. 5 3 The court
noted that the General Assembly authorized the Commissioner to
"supervise the administration" of the Welfare and Social Services
provisions of the Code and to see that the laws "are carried out to
their true intent and spirit."'51 4 Since the guidelines did not "pur-
port to be a substitute for the statute" but were merely intended
to assist local social services workers in administering the statute,
the court found that the guidelines do not have the force of law
and did not, therefore, affect any right of W.155 The court also
found that the guidelines were not inconsistent with the statute.'56
The court of appeals also rejected the trial court's ruling that the
guidelines are overly broad or void for vagueness. Because W. did
not argue that the guidelines affected his "exercise of a protected
first amendment activity," the court ruled that a constitutional
overbreadth analysis was unnecessary.' Additionally, because the
guidelines were adjudged to be interpretive rules lacking the force
and effect of law, the court applied a less strict standard of preci-
148. Id. (citing Papachriston v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972)).
149. 22 Va. Cir. at 129.
150. Id. at 131.
151. Id. at 131-32.
152. Jackson v. W., 14 Va. App. - , 419 S.E.2d 385 (1992).
153. Id. at -, 419 S.E.2d at 389-90.
154. Id. at -, 419 S.E.2d at 389 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 63.1-4 (Repl. Vol. 1991)).
155. Jackson, 14 Va. App. at - , 419 S.E.2d at 389.
156. Id. at -, 419 S.E.2d at 391.
157. Id. at -, 419 S.E.2d at 393 n.10.
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
sion and clarity, and on the facts found the definition of "mental
abuse" was "not so ambiguous as to require W. to guess at their
meaning."' 58
Finally, in addressing W.'s -'ontention that the guidelines de-
prived him of due process, the court applied the two-step analysis
of Klimko v. Virginia Employment Commission.'"9 The Jackson
court conceded merit in the Commissioner's argument that due
process analysis was unwarranted because protective services pro-
ceedings are investigations rather than adjudications. However, it
also noted that findings of child abuse are "binding determina-
tion[s] that a party did abuse a child."'160 The court ruled that in
any event, the procedures afforded W. were constitutionally
adequate. 6'
I. Deference to Agency Expertise
Reviewing courts commonly defer to agency expertise, particu-
larly on complex technical issues. The more esoteric the issue and
the more expert the agency, the more likely is the court to defer.
An example of a situation in which a court is not likely to defer
is noted in Fairfax Surgical Center v. State Health Commis-
sioner.'62 The State Health Commissioner determined that a sur-
gery center would need a Certificate of Public Need before con-
structing an out-patient operating room. 6 3 The operating room
required review by the Commissioner if it was a "significant
change" to a "project."' 64 A "project" is, among other things, an
expenditure that increases the total number of beds. 65 The Com-
missioner determined that adding an operating room was a signifi-
cant change because an operating room was "synonymous with a
bed" and the addition of an operating room therefore increased the
number of beds. 66
158. Id. at - , 419 S.E.2d at 392.
159. 216 Va. 750, 222 S.E.2d 559, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 849 (1976).
160. Jackson, 14 Va. App. at - , 419 S.E.2d at 395.
161. Id. at - , 419 S.E.2d at 397.
162. 12 Va. App. 576, 405 S.E.2d 430 (1991).
163. Id. at 577, 405 S.E.2d at 431.
164. See id. at 577-78, 408 S.E.2d at 431.
165. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-102.1 (Rep. Vol. 1992).
166. Fairfax Surgical Ctr., 12 Va. App. at 578, 405 S.E.2d at 432.
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The court disagreed. 167 Since "bed" is a non-technical word, the
court construed it in its ordinary sense, and ordinarily "bed" does
not mean "operating room."'16 8 The court noted that if an issue
falls outside the specialized competence of an agency (such as con-
stitutional and statutory interpretation issues), little deference is
owed to the agency.'69 In short, courts are unlikely to give much
deference to the agency's interpretation of a statute when an
agency decision is (1) an issue of law, such as a constitutional or
statutory interpretation issue; (2) a non-technical issue; and (3)
outside the specialized competence of the agency. 170
Another factor that increases the deference given an agency is
the agency's adherence to its interpretation for an extended period.
In Cruz v. Virginia Employment Commission,'7 ' a former em-
ployee claimed the right to file an untimely appeal from a decision
by the Virginia Employment Commission Claims Deputy because
an appeal request by the hospital was lost in the mail.172 The ex-
aminer accepted this explanation as "good cause shown" for a late
appeal.'7 3 The court held that because the Commission had treated
a document lost in the mail as "good cause" for at least the last
twenty years, "great weight" should be given to this position.1 4
In Metropolitan Cleaning Corp. v. Crawley, 5 the Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia affirmed a Virginia Workers' Compensation Com-
mission finding that Crawley was an "employee," rather than an
independent contractor, in her employment as a domestic
worker.176 The court therefore agreed with the Commission's deci-
sion to count her earnings from similar employment in determining
her average weekly wage.' 77
The court said that "[w]hat constitutes an 'employee' is a ques-
tion of law; however, whether a specific person falls within that
167. Id. at 579, 405 S.E.2d at 432.
168. Id. at 579-80, 405 S.E.2d at 432. The court did not address what would seem to be a
more straightforward analysis, which is that the operating room would increase the number
of beds if the operating table in the room is called a "bed." See id.
169. Id. at 579, 405 S.E.2d at 432 (citations omitted)..
170. See id.
171. 25 Va. Cir. 525 (Fairfax County 1991).
172. Id. at 525-26.
173. Id. at 526.
174. Id.
175. 14 Va. App. -, 416 S.E.2d 35 (1992) (en banc).
176. Id. at -, 416 S.E.2d at 37.
177. Id.
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definition 'is usually a question of fact.' ,,178 Although the evidence
was conflicting, there was credible evidence to support the Com-
mission's finding that Crawley was an employee, and the court
could not disturb this finding. a7 The court noted that the scope of
judicial review of fact-finding by the Workers' Compensation Com-
mission "is severely limited, partly in deference to the agency's ex-
pertise in a specialized field."' 80 The court emphasized the experi-
ence developed by the Commission in deciding such questions and
said that its findings of fact would be upheld so long as its deci-
sions were "reasonable and rational."''
J. Standard of Review
Several recent cases applied the familiar standards of review
used by courts in reviewing agency action. By and large these cases
added nothing remarkable to existing law.
Wolfe v. University of Virginia 82 was a circuit court case in
which the court was called upon to review the University of Vir-
ginia's decision that a student was not entitled to pay lower, in-
state tuition. 8 ' Because this was the second time the student had
petitioned, the University argued that its earlier decision had res
judicata effect.18 4 The court rejected this argument, finding that
the legislature in effect intended to allow students to petition more
than once when circumstances change. 18 5
Describing the court's role, the court said that review is not de
novo, but rather is based solely on an established administrative
record. 88 The court is not to assess the merits of petitioners'
claims but is to determine "whether the appellate determination
was at least supportable and not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary
178. Id. at -, 416 S.E.2d at 37 (quoting Intermodal Servs., Inc. v. Smith, 234 Va. 596,
600, 364 S.E.2d 221, 223 (1988)).
179. Crawley, 14 Va. App. at -, 416 S.E.2d at 37.
180. Id. at -, 416 S.E.2d at 38 (quoting Brown v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
(Transworld Airlines), 505 Pa. 35, 38, 476 A.2d 900, 902 (1984)).
181. Id. at -, 416 S.E.2d at 38.
182. 22 Va. Cir. 191 (Albemarle County 1990).
183. See id. at 191.
184. Id. at 192.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 193.
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to law.' 1 817 The court exercises a quasi-appellate function, similar
to an appellate court applying a "clearly erroneous" standard. 88
In the accompanying case, also called Wolfe v. University of Vir-
ginia, 89 the court rejected Wolfe's appeal, holding that the deci-
sion by the University was supported by "substantial evidence"
and neither "arbitrary, capricious, nor otherwise contrary to
law.,,190
In another case where a petitioner was claiming the right to in-
state tuition (which turns on domiciliary intent), Wickham v. Vir-
ginia Commonwealth University,'9' the circuit court held that the
student had in fact established the intent to reside in Virginia and
was entitled to the lower tuition. 92 Here again the standard of re-
view was whether the decision "could reasonably be said, on the
basis of the record, to be supported by substantial evidence and
not to be arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise contrary to law."' 193
Under the "substantial evidence" test, said the court, the Univer-
sity's determination could be rejected only if a reasonable mind
would necessarily come to a different conclusion after a review of
the record.9 4 The court then held that the student had established
her intent to live in Virginia by "clear and convincing evidence.' 1 95
In Southerland v. ABC Stores, III, Inc.,9 6 the plaintiff was fired
from her job as a sales associate for Miller & Rhoads in the down-
town Richmond department store. 97 The Virginia Employment
Commission concluded that she had been insubordinate. 98
The standard of review as to the Commission's findings of fact
would be conclusive if supported by evidence and in the absence of
fraud, and the jurisdiction of the court would be confined to ques-
tions of law.'99 The plaintiff argued that the "substantial evidence"
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. 25 Va. Cir. 223 (Albemarle County 1991).
190. Id. at 226.
191. 23 Va. Cir. 479 (Richmond City 1991).
192. Id. at 483.
193. Id. at 480 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 23.7-4(H) (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
194. Id. at 480-81 (citing Virginia Real Estate Comm'n v. Bias, 226 Va. 264, 269, 308
S.E.2d 123, 125 (1983)).
195. Id. at 481.
196. 23 Va. Cir. 263 (Richmond City 1991).
197. See id. at 263-64.
198. Id. at 265.
199. Id. at 263 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 60.2-625(A) (RepI. Vol. 1992)).
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test should be applied in reviewing the Commission's decision.200
The court opined that although the substantial evidence test does
not apply to Virginia Code section 60.2-625(A), in any event, sub-
stantial evidence did support the decision of the Commission.20 1
In another case on employment benefits, Extra's, Inc. v. Virginia
Employment Commission,0 2 the court held that whether an em-
ployee was discharged for misconduct is a mixed question of law
and fact that is reviewable by the court notwithstanding a statu-
tory provision that factual findings are conclusive. 0 Under the
standard of review, the court decides whether the facts are "suffi-
cient in law to constitute misconduct. '20 4 Here, the court found
that the employee was guilty of misconduct and not qualified for
benefits. 05
In Armstrong v. Williams,20 s a young man who had a motorcycle
accident and subsequently failed to provide evidence of insurance
had his driver's license suspended by the Department of Motor Ve-
hicles.207 Under Code section 9-6.14:17, judicial review is limited to
(1) whether the agency acted in accordance with the law, (2)
whether the agency made a procedural error, and (3) whether the
agency had sufficient evidential support for its findings of fact.20 8
Only the third test was involved in this case. The determination of
factual issues in such a case is to be "made on the record, and the
inquiry is whether there is substantial relevant evidence in the rec-
ord so that a reasonable mind might accept it as adequate to sup-
port the agency's decision."209 A reviewing court may reject the
agency's findings of fact only if, considering the record as a whole,
a reasonable person would necessarily come to a different conclu-
sion." The court noted that it was not allowed to substitute its
200. Id. at 265.
201. Id.
202. 23 Va. Cir. 348 (Albemarle County 1991).
203. Id. at 349 (citing Barkley v. Peninsula Transp. Dist. Comm'n, 11 Va. App. 317, 398
S.E.2d 94 (1990)).
204. Id. (quoting Virginia Employment Comm'n v. Gartt, 7 Va. App. 631, 635, 376 S.E.2d
808, 811, aff'd en bane, 9 Va. App. 225, 385 S.E.2d 247 (1989)).
205. Id. at 351.
206. 24 Va. Cir. 173 (Spotsylvania County 1991).
207. Id. at 173-74.
208. Id. at 174; VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.14:17 (Repl. Vol. 1989).
209. Id. (citing Virginia Real Estate Comm'n v. Bias, 226 Va. 264, 308 S.E.2d 123 (1983);
State Bd. of Health v. Godney, 223 Va. 423, 290 S.E.2d 875 (1982)).
210. Id. at 174-75 (citing Bio-Medical Applications v. Kenley, 4 Va. App. 414, 358 S.E.2d
722 (1987)).
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judgment for that of the administrative hearing officer and agency
on a purely factual issue and concluded that the record supported
the Commissioner's factual conclusion.211
K. Evidence at Administrative Hearings
The rules of evidence are typically relaxed in administrative
hearings, but not to the point where lawyers can afford to disre-
gard basic tenets.
In Coy v. Virginia Employment Commission,212 a floor sweeper
at Philip Morris was denied unemployment compensation benefits
due to misconduct (stealing cigarettes).213 Certain key facts came
out at the hearing only through a Philip Morris investigator's re-
port of his findings and another person's affidavit stating that the
employee had sold him cigarettes.2 14 The evidence before the Com-
mission regarding the employee's involvement with the cigarettes
was based entirely on hearsay.21 5 Without the hearsay there was
nothing to tie him to bringing out or receiving the cigarettes with
guilty knowledge. 1 6
The court said that, because experience has shown hearsay to be
unreliable, when hearsay is present, there should be a "modicum"
of first-hand evidence - in this case evidence that the employee
was a participant in the crime. 217 In short, there must be non-hear-
say evidence sufficient to support the Commission finding. 218
L. Waiver of Objection
In re Grievance of Ashley2' 9 involved a review of a determina-
tion by the Acting County Executive that two men who did not file
grievances in a timely manner were not entitled to a final and
binding hearing by the Fairfax County Civil Service Commis-
sion.220 The court held that the county had waived its rights to
object by processing the tardy grievances to the fourth step of the
211. Id. at 175.
212. 23 Va. Cir. 428 (Richmond City 1991).
213. Id. at 428.
214. Id. at 429.
215. Id. at 430.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 431.
219. 25 Va. Cir. 359 (Fairfax County 1991).
220. Id. at 359.
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Grievance Procedure without objecting on the basis of Personnel
Regulation section 17.5-1, which requires a grievance to be brought
within fifteen workdays of the occurrence giving rise to the griev-
ance.221 The decision of the acting County Executive was
reversed.22
M. Freedom of Information Act; Executive Sessions
In Taylor v. Worrell Enterprises, Inc.,2 3 the Supreme Court of
Virginia noted that, while the General Assembly has tried to en-
sure public access to government records and meetings, this policy
is not absolute. 24 The court noted that the General Assembly has
identified forty-four instances in which certain information need
not be disclosed.225 In particular, an itemized list of long-distance
phone calls placed by the governor's office was exempt from
disclosure.226
Two cases addressed the manner in which agencies may hold
meetings under the Virginia Freedom of Information Act.227 Little
v. Virginia Retirement System228 addressed the conditions under
which an agency may go into "executive session" and exclude the
public. 229 In order to have such an executive session, an agency
must first vote in open session to convene the executive session.23 °
Then, at the conclusion of the executive session, the agency must
certify that it considered only matters lawfully exempted from
open meeting requirements. 23 ' Among the matters that can be dis-
cussed in executive session are personnel matters,23 2 legal mat-
ters, 23  and the "investing of public funds where competition or
bargaining is involved, where if made public initially the financial
interest of the governmental unit would be adversely affected. '234
221. Id. at 360.
222. Id. at 359.
223. 242 Va. 219, 409 S.E.2d 136 (1991).
224. Id. at 224, 409 S.E.2d at 139.
225. Id.
226. See id.
227. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-340 to -346.1 (Repl. Vol. 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
228. 21 Va. Cir. 248 (Richmond City 1990).
229. See id. at 248.
230. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-344.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
231. Id. at 248-49 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-344.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
232. Id. at 250 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-344(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
233. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-344(A)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
234. Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-344(A)(6) (Cum. Supp. 1992)).
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The Board of Trustees of the Virginia Retirement System (VRS)
and two of its committees had held a number of executive sessions,
and the plaintiff claimed that these meetings were improper.2 35
Since no minutes had been taken at any of the executive sessions,
the court ordered minutes to be prepared from the recollections of
the members who attended, and all members in attendance were
required to certify under oath that the reconstructed minutes were
accurate and complete.2 36 After examining the minutes of the
meetings in camera, the court directed the Board and its commit-
tees to keep minutes of all future executive sessions until otherwise
ordered.37
The court found that the Code had indeed been violated.2 a In
some cases, votes to go into executive session were not reflected in
the minutes and certifying votes were not taken after the executive
sessions were concluded.23
The affirmative vote to go into executive session requires that
the motion state specifically the purpose of the session and reason-
ably identify the substance of matters to be discussed.240 The peti-
tioner argued that the agency should have been more specific than
merely reciting "personnel matters," "legal matters," and "divest-
ment" of the VRS holdings in companies doing business in or with
the Republic of South Africa as the topics to be discussed.241
Relying on the earlier cases of Marsh v. Richmond Newspapers,
Inc.242 and Nageotte v. King George County,243 the court noted
that, when going into executive sessions to discuss "personnel mat-
ters," it is not necessary to identify the personnel involved.244 The
court recognized that giving details about the personnel matters
would be tantamount to disclosing the names of employees at is-
sue.245 As for "legal matters," the court noted that Marsh v. Rich-
mond Newspapers requires more than a bare reference to "legal
235. Id. at 248.
236. Id. at 249-50.
237. Id. at 249.
238. Id. at 251.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 251-52 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-344.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1992))..
241. Id. at 252.
242. 223 Va. 245, 288 S.E.2d 415 (1982).
243. 223 Va. 259, 288 S.E.2d 423 (1982).
244. Little, 21 Va. Cir. at 250.
245. See id. at 255.
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matters." 4" The specific agenda item, or at least a statement of the
subject matter which requires the discussion of legal matters, must
be stated.24 7 The court found that the Investment Advisory Com-
mittee had violated the Freedom of Information Act at a meeting
where it called an executive session for discussing "legal mat-
ters. '24s Where calling an executive session to discuss legal matters
involving the proposed "CSX/RF&P merger" would have been a
sufficient disclosure, simply referring to "legal matters" was not.2 49
With respect to investing public funds, the court opined that
normally matters to be discussed under the "investing of public
funds" exemption, like the "personnel matters" exemption, cannot
be identified in any greater detail than by quoting the language of
the exemption itself.250 "To hold otherwise would inform keen in-
vestors of the particular investments involved," thus affecting the
market.251
In short, the court held that
where identification or explanation of matters to be discussed in ex-
ecutive session would amount to [public] disclosure of matters which
are exempt from such disclosure, or where such identification or ex-
planation would defeat the very purpose for going into executive
sessions in the first place, more than a citation to the statutory ex-
emption and a general statement of the exemption is not required.252
The court viewed this as the "common sense" approach approved
in the Marsh case.253
Although there were violations of the Act, the court declined to
issue an injunction.254 The violations were "purely technical," and
the court was assured by legal counsel that the procedural viola-
tions were already well on the way to being corrected. 255 The Board
now had legal counsel at its meetings, and more recent minutes of
246. Id. at 257.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 254.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 255.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 258.
255. Id.
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meetings reflected that the voting requirements were being com-
plied with.256
In a later development, the Circuit Court of the City of Rich-
mond concluded that RF&P is a "public body" subject to the Vir-
ginia Freedom of Information Act owing to the "peculiar relation-
ship" between the VRS Board and the RF&P Board.251 The court
also found that VRS was therefore obligated to provide the peti-
tioner with notice of RF&P Board meetings. Further, the court
characterized the FOIA violations as willful, knowing, and substan-
tial on the part of both the VRS Board and its chairperson.25 8
In American Civil Liberties Union of Virginia v. Andrews,2 59 the
ACLU charged that thirteen members of the Senate Finance Com-
mittee had held a closed meeting at Senator Gray's hunting lodge
in Chesterfield County.260 At the meeting, the committee staff
made a presentation to the members about the state budget.21 1 It
was obvious that the meeting, though characterized as a "holiday
get-together," was conceived, planned, and conducted for the pur-
pose of performing the business of the Senate Finance Committee
of the General Assembly.26
2
Virginia Code section 2.1-343 requires generally that all meetings
be public meetings and that notice of all meetings be given to any
citizen who requests it.263 However, it also refers to exceptions
"specifically provided by law. '264 Code section 2.1-341 specifically
exempts from the Act's notice requirements "informal meetings or
gatherings of the members of the General Assembly. ' 26 5 The court
concluded that the holiday get-together was an "informal
meeting. '216
Reviewing the legislative history of the Virginia Freedom of In-
formation Act, the court noted that the Act recognizes three dis-
tinct types of gathering among public officials: (4) formal meetings,
256. Id.
257. Little v. Virginia Retirement System, No. HB-1298 (Richmond City Cir. Ct. Aug. 5,
1992).
258. See VA. LAw. WKLY., August 31, 1992, at 18.
259. 24 Va. Cir. 443 (Richmond City 1991).
260. Id. at 443.
261. Id. at 446.
262. Id.
263. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-343 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
264. Id.
265. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-341 (Cum. Supp. 1992).
266. 24 Va. Cir. at 448.
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(5) informal meetings, and (6) gatherings at which officials do not
discuss or transact any public business and which are not called or
arranged for the purpose of discussing or transacting any public
business.6 7 The third category is not covered by the Act at all.2 8
Before and after 1977, formal and informal meetings of all public
entities other than the General Assembly were and are equally
subject to the Act, there being no distinction between formal and
informal meetings as to notice requirements or anything else.269
In 1977, however, the General Assembly placed itself on an equal
footing with other public entities with respect to two of these cate-
gories.27 The legislature made its formal meetings, and those of its
committees, subject to all the requirements, notice and otherwise,
that apply to all public bodies subject to the Act.2 71 The legislature
excluded from the Act's coverage gatherings of its members and of
its committees where the purpose is not to discuss or transact any
public business.272 The one difference that the General Assembly
made for itself was with respect to informal meetings.2 7 3 Thus,
while the legislature decided to treat its formal meetings and non-
business gatherings like those of other public bodies, it elected to
treat its informal meetings differently.274 Specifically, while the in-
formal meetings of all other public bodies subject to the Act must
conform with the Act's notice requirements and other provisions,
informal meetings of the General Assembly and its committees
need not conform to the notice provisions of the Act.2
Looking at the December 28 meeting and noting that it had no
written agenda, no notebooks of written material provided, no list
of speakers to be heard, no gaveling of the meeting to order or
calling of the roll, no minutes taken, and no votes being cast, the
court decided that this was in fact an "informal meeting" and that
the respondents did not violate the Act by failing to give notice of
it.276
267. Id. at 449.
268. See id.
269. See id.
270. See id at 448-49.
271. See id.
272. Id. at 450.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 451.
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N. Public Procurement
In Michael, Harris & Rosato Brothers v. Fairfax Redevelopment
& Housing Authority,277 the court held that it had no jurisdiction
over a contract dispute decision issued by a public body after the
expiration of the six-month appeal period specified in Virginia
Code section 11-69(D) 7 ' The Virginia Public Procurement Act
regulates all stages of the public procurement process and
prescribes the administrative and judicial remedies available to
contractors involved in disputes with public bodies. 279
The Michael, Harris firm contracted with the Fairfax Redevelop-
ment and Housing Authority to build townhouses. A dispute arose,
and the Authority denied the builder's claim for money to pay
sewer availability fees.28 0 The builder filed an action with the court
more than six months after the Authority's decision.281 Virginia
Code section 11-69(D) provides that a contractor must appeal
within six months of the date of the agency's final decision. 282 Be-
cause the complaint had not been timely filed, the court had no
jurisdiction.8 3
0. Jurisdiction: Judicial Review of the State Corporation
Commission
In Pendergraph v. Woodlawn Country Club, Inc.284 Judge
Jamborsky held that the circuit court cannot review the validity of
an act by the State Corporation Commission.8 5 Code section 13.1-
614(B) provides that no court, except the Virginia Supreme Court
by way of appeal as authorized by law, has jurisdiction to review,
reverse, correct, or annul any action of the State Corporation Com-
mission.28 The SCC had issued a Certificate of Amendment, which
277. 23 Va. Cir. 272 (Fairfax County 1991).
278. Id. at 274.
279. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 11-35 to -80 (Repl. Vol. 1989 & Cum. Supp. 1992); see also W.M.
Schlosser Co. v. Fairfax County Redevelopment & Housing Auth., No. 90-2177(L) (E.D. Va.
Sept. 17, 1992) (parties may not validly contract contrary to the plain terms of the Procure-
ment Act).
280. Michael, Harris & Rosato Bros., 23 Va. Cir. at 272.
281. See id.
282. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-69(D) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
283. Michael, Harris & Rosato Bros., 23 Va. Cir. at 274.
284. 22 Va. Cir. 203 (Fairfax County 1990).
285. See id at 203-04.
286. Id. at 203 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-614(B) (Repl. Vol. 1989)).
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the plaintiff then claimed in circuit court was null and void.2 ' The
certificate was clearly within the SCC's authority, and it was acting
in a "purely ministerial matter. 2 88 Thus, the circuit court had no
jurisdiction.28 9
P. Agency's Compliance With Its Own Rules
In Virginia Committee for Fair Utility Rates v. Virginia Elec-
tric & Power Co.,290 the Virginia Supreme Court reversed the
SCC's grant of expedited rate relief. The SCC allowed the power
company to include an accounting adjustment for projected future
"construction work in progress" even though it had discontinued
this adjustment in 1986. The SCC had relied on language in its
rules allowing it to "take appropriate action" when there is a "sub-
stantial change in circumstances." The SCC is not empowered,
said the court, to waive rules that emanate from a grant of power
conferred by Article IX, Section 3 of the Virginia Constitution and
Code sections 12.1-25 and -28.291
287. Id. at 204.
288. Id. at 203-04.
289. See id.
290. 243 Va. 320, 414 S.E.2d 834 (1992).
291. Id. at 437, 414 S.E.2d at 837. See VA. CONST. art. IX, § 3; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 12.1-25, -
28 (Repl. Vol. 1989). For a commentary on the implications of this decision, see ADMIN. L.
NEws, Winter 1991-92/Spring 1992, at 4.
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